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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Depression is perhaps the oldest and most common 
of all the mental disorders. The Book of Job in the 
Old Testament is a self-report of ..classical clinical 
depression. Within a r10rmal population, up to fifteen 
percent of the people may be afflicted by significant 
depressive symptoms (Secunda, 1973). Depression as a 
clinical problem is characterized by more than the 
mood deviation commonly associated with this disorder. 
Along with the mood alteration are cognitive, behav-
ioral and physical symptoms of depression (Beck, 1967; 
Zung, 1973). 
Fr.Jfll thf' tim-= ·of E'liil K::::-aep lin much interr:~st has 
been focused on depression a.s a disease, with the 
etiology of the problem thought to be some physio-
logical malfunction. Recent work in this area tends 
to indicate that there exists a genetic basis for a 
subset of the depressive disorders, the manic de-
pressive disease (Winokur, Clayton a~d Reich, 1969). 
It was found that patients with manic behaviors 
tended to have two generations of affective illness 
in their families •. The existance of two types of 
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affective illness was postulated• manic-depressive 
(bi.polar) and depressive (unpolar). Using markers 
located on the X - chromosome, evidence was found 
supporting an X - linked dominant transmission of 
bipolar but not unipolar psychoses. 
Schildkraut (1965) proposed a catecholamine 
theory of depression. It was thought that mania is 
associated withan excess of norepinephrine at the 
synaptic junctions in the brain, while depression is 
due to an absolute or relative dcficiencJ rf 
norepinephrine. Norepinephrine, serotonin and 
d·opamine are transmitter substances which "carry" 
the impulse of one neuron across a synapse to another 
neuron. As originally proposed the biogenic animes 
theory is over simplified, Secunda (1973) reported 
that the unipolar - bipolar distinction is reinforced 
and modified by pharmacological manipulation. Mono-
amine oxidase (a chemical which deactivates 
transmitter substances), when chemically inhibited, 
had antidepressant effects with unipolar patients but 
not with bipolar patients. L-dopa (which increases 
dopamine levels in the brain) had no antidepressant 
effect in 25 percent of the unipolar patients but 
lessened depression in the rest of the patients. In 
bipolar patients this substance produces mania, but 
without relieving depression. Lithium has moderate 
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antidepressant properties in bipolar patients but it 
also has antimanic effects. Schildkraut (1971) has 
modified his original position and states that the 
previously proposed relationship between mood and 
catacholoamines is not as simple or direct as inital-
ly thought. 
Bourdillon a~d Ridges (1971) have proposed a 
theory of schizophrenia based on abnormal levels of 
cerebral catecholamines. There is a problem with 
ct.P-rr.ical theoriEs in t31at starting wi ·th ps;:;ch:>path-· 
o1ogy and going to a physiological abnormality the 
route is fairly direct; but the physiological aspects 
of these theories are not different enough to be able 
to specify if a person with a specific physiological 
abnormality would be depressed or schizophrenic. In 
other words, abnormal catacholamine levels may be 
necessary for both schizophrenia and affective dis-
orders, but sufficient conditions include other 
factors which allow for differentiation of the dis-
order~ above and beyond physiological differentiation. 
Diaz-Guerrero, Gottlieb and Knott (1946) first 
reported differences in the electroencephalographic 
tracings of depressed and normal individuals. fr7a.Dic-
depressives had difficulty falling asleep and frequent 
and early awakening. Their sleep was characterized 
by a greater proportion of light sleep and more and 
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frequent oscillation from one level to another. A 
recent review (Secunda, 1973) reports continued sup-
port for the importance of fragmentation and 
shallowness of sleep to depression. It is also re-
ported that rapid-eye-movement (REI.'i) sleep is reduced 
among depressed patients and that it is reduced out of 
proportion to the amount of total loss of sleep. 
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Recently, social learning theorists (Ferster, 1973; 
Lazarus, 1968; Lewinsohn, Weinstein and Shaw, 1969) have 
stateG that one of th~ major features of depression is a 
reduced frequency of behaviors. The low frequency of 
behaviors is thought to be caused by a low rate of rein-
forcement (Lewinsohn and Atwood, 1969) coupled perhaps 
with aversive stimulation (Ferster, 1973). Originally 
Lewinsohn (Lewinsohn and Atwood, 1969) hypothesized that 
depression was caused by decrease in reinforcement ir-
respective of the contigencies of the reinforcement. 
However, more recently Lewinsohn (Lewinsohn and Graf, 
1973; Lewinsohn and Li bet• 1972) has modified his 
position, specifying that a decreased rate of response-
contingent reinforcement acts as an eliciting stimulus 
for some depressive behaviors. The idea of loss of re-
inforcement irrespective of contingencies is 
incorporated into the revised model in that certain 
environmental events (e.g, death of a spouse) and some 
traits and states (e.g. lack of' social skills) are 
related to low rate of positive reinforcement and 
thus depression occurs. It is thought that the de-
ressed person is en an extended extinction schedule. 
This ·lesser rate cf reinforcement causes a lower out-
put of behaviors which, in turn, elicits less rein-
forcement from the environment. The social environ-
ment is thought, in other words, to interact with 
the depressed person to worsen his condition by 
reinforcing depressive symptoms. 
7"..JSwinsohn (L::;'\iinsohn ard Graf, 1913) has fo!.md t:~;at 
there is a significant telationship between meed and the 
number of pleasant activities in which subjects engage. 
This relationship is predicted by the behavioral :nodel, 
with a more depressed mood corresponding to fewer pleas-
ant activities. ·,'ihile the pleasant activities reported 
by the subjects do not constitute a measure of the 
total amount of reinforcement received by people, the 
pleasant event schedule employed is an index of the 
amount of pleasure obtained by the individual. 
One problem with these studies has to do with 
the direction of causality. The behavioral model 
states that a low rate of reinforcement precipitates 
depression. It is just as reasonable on a ~riori 
basis to speculate that the depressed person will re-
duce his activities. Cross-lagged correlations 
(mood correlated with the pleasant event of tte 
5 
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preceding and the following days) were obtained 
(Lewinsohn and Graf, 1973) to hopefully clarify this 
problem, but neither explanation was supported as no 
relationship of causality could be predicted. It is 
interesting to note that the activities most associated 
with mood fell into three catagories; activities involv-
ing positive social interactions, affect incompatable 
with depression and ego-supportive activities. 'I he ego-
supportive activities imply a cognitive aspect which 
will be dlscus~ed later. 'I'!1e 1·elations:1i!) bet'\:ee;t de-
pression and social interaction has been demonstrated 
empirically. 
Libet and Lewinsohn (1973) have defined social 
skills in terms of the social consequences of behav-
iors. In other words, the actions emitted by the 
person a.s well as the responses elicited from the 
environment determine the social competence of a per-
sen. It was E~..rgued that depressed people have lower 
social skills and, therefore, elicit less positive re-
inforcement from the environment. It was found that 
depressed subjects emitted about half as many actions 
as nondepressed subjects. Reciprocity was evident in 
that the subjects who emitted the largest number of 
behaviors tended to have the most actions directed to-
ward them (correlations of elicited to emitted 
behaviors varied from .85 to .96). There was no 
r 
difference in the number of negative reactions emitted 
by the depressed and nondepressed subjects. However, 
nondepressed subjects emitted more positive reactions 
than the depressed group. It is evident from these 
findings that depressed people generally have lower 
social skills and therefore tend to elicit less rein-
forcement from the environment. This relative absence 
of reinforcement tends to support the behavioral view 
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of depression which ties the level of depression direct-
ly· ·':;o the a.mount of rE:infcrcement an ine.:.vidual r.:cd.Y::o. 
But, again, the direction of causation is an open 
ouestion. 
Seligman (Seligman, 1973; Seligman, 1975J Miller 
and Seligman, 1973) has proposed a model of depression 
that may help explain the lack of data indicating a di-
rect causal relationship between depression and amount 
of reinforcement. An indirect relationship is thought 
to exist, with the intervening variable being of a cog-
nitive nature. The learned helplessness model of 
depression is an outgrowth of animal studies in which 
inescapable shock was administered to dogs. After a 
series of trials the animals no longer tried to escape 
and when put into a situation in which escape was easy, 
the animals did not learn the response which would ter-
minate the pain. Similar results of learned helpless-
ness have been found with human subjects (Thornton and 
Jacobs, 1971). Many of the symptoms that learned 
helplessness animals exhibit are strikingly similar. to 
those of a depressed person (Secunda, 1973). Among 
the similarities are passivity, lack of aggression, 
norepinephrine ·depletion and loss of libido. From 
these data a theory of human depression emerged. 
The learned helplessness model states that it is 
not the trauma per ~ (electric shock for dogs or loss 
of reinforcement for humans) that causes the pathology, 
but it is the <Jxperiencf..: of ::aving no contx·ol over the 
trauma. In other words, the individual learns that 
he is helpless and can no longer affect his world in a 
significant way. According to this model rewards as 
well as punishment and nonreward can cause depression. 
The main factor involved is whether or not the rewards 
or punishments are contingent upon the behaviors of a 
person. If there is independence between one's 
efforts and positive and negative experiences, this 
will lead to learned helplessness or depression. 
An alternative explanation to the behaviors 
classified as learned· and helplessness is offered by 
Weis, Glazer and Pohorecky (1974). After observing a 
norepinephrine depletion in the brain following stress, 
it was thought that a chemical as opposed to a cogni-
tive change may give a better explanation for the 
behaviors of animals given inescapable shock. After 
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a delay period (48 hours) animals had no trouble learn-
ing the proper response to escape the shock. This 
recovery is indicative of a temporary physiological 
change and not a more permanent cognitive alteration. 
A brief cold swim produces a norepinephrine depletion 
in rats, but is not thought to be traumatic enough to 
produce learned helplessness. After the swim, the 
animals behaved in a way similar to those administered . 
inescapable shock. The behavior deficit was not 
prese11t when the rats swam in warm water {which doec 
not decrease norepinephrine levels). 
Weis et al.constructed an escape situation in 
which less movement was required to terminate the 
shock. If the learned helplessness model is correct 
the amount of motor activity required to escape should 
make no difference. If the animals failed to terminate 
the shock because they could not move due to low 
norepinephrine level, however, they should be able to 
succeed with the simpler task. With the less demanding 
task neither inescapable shock nor a cold swim impaired 
the escape performance of the animals. To further con-
firm the physiological explanation levels of norepine-
phrine were measuredo Again support was obtained as 
levels of the drug were consistent with the behavioral 
results. It is important to note that Weis, et aL do 
not rule out the existance of learned helplessness. 
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They only argue that. the original studies do not pre-
sent evidence supporting such a hypothesis • 
. Recently Seligman (1975) has pointed out some 
10 
data that the chemical theory cannot easily handle. 
Rats who were presented unsolvable discrimination tasks 
did not have norepinephrine depletions but failed to 
solve subsequent problems. Animals who received non-
contingent food had trouble later learning to press a 
bar for food. An importiant study overlooked by Weis 
et al. ( 1974) wa~ p~rform~d by Seli:~man :and. Maier ( 1967) • 
Three sets of dogs were placed in Pavlovian hammocks. 
The first group received no shock. The second group 
was shocked, but could terminate the shock by pressing 
a bar with their nose. The third group had no control 
over the shock, but received the same intensity and 
duration shock as the animals in the second group. 
Only the third group exhibited learned helplessness in 
a later escape situation. Therefore, it appears that 
the learr-ing (or lack of it) is more important in ex-
hibiting helpless behaviors than the shock -Eer ~· 
One must again go beyond a chemical explanation to 
understand the mechanisms of learned helplessness. 
It is thought here that a cognitive explanation 
best suits the purpose of adding the missing dimension 
to a better understanding of depression. Even in 
normal people stress will cause an increase in 
11 
catechol e.xcretion. The question then is why does 
some environmental event (or series of events) cause 
depression in some people, and schizophrenia in others, 
while a large group of people are not adversely affect-
ed to any significant degree. According to ·the learned 
helplessness model depression is characterized by a 
specific cognitive distortion in the perception of one's 
ability to change the environment. Miller and Seligman 
(1973) have demonstrated that this perceived helplessness 
exiuts in de:flre;ss,~d stude;nt~. Stude11ts v.ere dl vidE.d. 
into four groups based on their scores on a depression 
inventory (Beck, 1967) and Rotter's (1966) internal-
external locus of control scale. The subjects were 
presented two tasks& . a skill task (really under the 
experimenter's control) requiring the subject to raise 
a platform without having a ball positioned on it roll 
off, and a chance task in which subjects were reouired to 
predict four out of five times per trial whether an X or 
an 0 would appear on a screen. It was arranged so that 
every subject succeeded on the first and final trial of 
both tasks. Subjects were asked before each trial their 
certainty (on a scale of 0 to 10) of success on the 
following trial, and were promised a $.10 reward for 
each success and $.10 was subtracted for each failure. 
Success was controled so that each subject had a 50% 
reinforcement schedule for both tasks~· The dependent 
measures were the change in expectancy after the first 
success and two measures of cumulative expectancy 
change. 
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On the initial expectancy, there were no differ-
ences between aDy groups. Overall, the learned 
helplessness model was supported. There were no sig-
nificant differences along the internal-external locus 
of control dimension, so subjects will only be discussed 
as high and low depression groups. The nondepressed 
ar!d depressed gt'Dups did nc..t differ h: their expeottt.n(;J 
changes on aDy of the measures in the chance task. In 
the skill task the low depression group showed greater 
expectancy changes than the depressed group. The non-
depressed group also showed higher expectancy changes 
in the skill task than in the chance task. Depression 
scores were negatively correlated with expectancy 
change in the skill task but not in the chance task. 
The results indicated that in the skill task, depres-
sed subjects were less affected by success experiences 
than the nondepressed subjects. This lack of influ-
ence was attributed to the cognitive distortion that 
one is helpless and therefore cannot affect the envi-
ronment in a si~1ificant way. 
Another interpretation is· offered here. for the 
lack of effect of reinforcement on depressed sub-
jects which involves a cognitive distortion different 
lJ 
from learned helplessness. It is proposed that each 
person has a level of competency of acceptance above 
whiqh self-reinforcement will occur. For example, a 
beginning golfer will reinforce himself for getting a 
score below 100, but a pro must be within a few strokes 
of par before he defines the event as rewarding. A 
depressed person is thought to set his expectations so 
high that the environmental reinforcement looses its 
reinforcement value. Loss of reinforcer effectiveness 
ha.s '.:leen propuscd by Costello ~1972) as an explan&ticn 
for depression. His explanation differs from the one 
presented here in that Costello links the loss of 
effectiveness to the interruption of a chain of be-
haviors leading to the goal. 
The idea of perceptual and cognitive distortion 
among depressed people has support from the literature. 
Mezey and Cohen· (1964) found that depressed people 
feel that time passes more slowly than normals and 
this distortion disappears on recovery from depres-
sion. Distortion of spatial judgement has been 
reported by Fisher (1964). Beck (1967) has proposed 
a model of depression based upon cognitive distortions. 
The faulty cognitions are hypothesized to have an 
etiological relationship to the affective, motivation-
al and physical aspects of depression. Beck 
hypothesized a primary cognitive triad composed of ari 
individual viewing himself, his world and his future 
in a negative way, The negative triad is thought to 
originate out of stress experiences or is transmitted 
to the person from significant others. 
The idea presented here is not incompatable with 
Beck's cognitive triad, nor with Seligman's learned 
helplessness. Inordinantly high goals may have an 
etiological influence and, more importantly, a main-
taining relationship with depression. While learned 
helpless-ness rr..ay come about ~olely thruugh failu:c8 tc 
receive contingent reinforcement, in humans this con-
dition is preceded, perhaps, by too high of an expec-
tation level for self-reinforcement, The variation 
in self-reinforcement levels is thought to be why 
stressful situations will cause depression in some 
people and not in others, Those people predisposed 
to depression have contingency levels higher than 
those not so predisposed. The cognitive triad of 
Beck can also be understood in terms of an expec-
tancy level which is unrealistically high. The 
person perceives himself as helpless because he is 
unable to be as inordinantly successful as his expec-
tations demand. The world is bad because it does not 
allow him to,satisfy his unrealistic goals. Because 
his behavioral repertoire is exhausted, the future 
also looks dim. 
14 
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Depressed people probably do not have inordina~t 
expectations for everything they do. In some severe 
cases, however, extreme goals may be pervasive. The 
amount of depression is thought to be positively re-
lated to the number and importance of areas in which 
too much is demanded. The amount of ego involvement in 
an area is thought to be the factor determining whether 
or ~ot inordinant expectations will be employed in the 
area. Miller and Seligman (1973) found no differences 
in -'che initial expectancies be tween ciepr·essed and !.iOn-
depressed students for predicting success on a chance 
task or a skill task. Even though monetary rewards 
were given for success ($.10 per trial), it .is not 
enough to warrant any major degree of ego involvement 
among college students. 
Schwartz (1974) found overly high expectations for 
depressed students in an ego involved task. The dif-
ferences between actual and predicted final grades, 
along with a measure of depression, were obtained from 
male college students. 'I'he goal discrepancy (predicted 
minus actual grade) was found to correlate with the 
depression scale scores. In other words, those students 
who overestimated their final grades (i.e. set an. 
expectancy level which was too high) were the most de-
pressed students. It may be assumed that the final 
grades for the students in the Schwartz study entailed 
much greater ego involvement than the simple tasks 
in Miller and Seligman's study, thus making grade 
exp~ctancy a predictor of depression. 
The purpose of the present study was to further 
explore the relationship of ego involvement in a task 
to depression. The basic design of Miller and 
Seligman (1973) was employed. The ch~~ce task was 
16 
assumed to have minimal ego involvement and the skill 
task was.thought to have some ego involvement,. since it 
I' 
rs:qu.ired some ccmp-:;tar..cy ir perceptua2.-rr.otor skill, br~t 
for students this involvement was assumed to be little. 
l"-Io monetary rewards were given for either task in 
order to determine the effects of rewards. A third 
task was used to determine if the expectancies o-f 
success are overestimated on tasks in which the sub-
jects are very ego involved. Test scores on midterm 
examinations were used as this latter taske 
It was hypothesized that depressed and nondepres-
sed subjects would not differ in their expected goals 
or expectancies for success on the chance task due to 
no ego involvement. On the skill task depressed sub-
jects were expected to have lower expecta~cies of 
success and set lower goals on the task because of 
their learned helplessness. This difference was pre-
dicted because of a low level of ego involvement. 
With the ego involved task depressed subjects were 
expected to overestimate their performa~ce more than 
nondepressed subjects. 
The relationship between these tasks and goal 
expectancy centers around the importance of the task 
17 
in defining the person's self esteem (i.e. ego 
involvement). Performance on the chance task was 
assumed to be of little importance in determining what 
a person felt about himself. Therefore, goals and 
probabilities of success should be of little importance 
t0 T.he person and would not di:'fer betw,~en depressed 
and nondepressed subjects. Performance on the skill 
task was thought to be of some (but minimal) impor-
tance in determining the subject's self concept. 
Therefore depressed subjects were predicted to set 
lower goals and to estimate lower probabilities of 
obtaining these goals. Both of these underestimations 
would be predicted by the learned helplessness model 
and the negative triad of Beck (1967). 
It was assumed that performance on the high ego · 
involved task was of greater importance to the subjects 
in defining their competency and self esteem. If 
depressed people expect to do less well on important 
tasks than what they are capable of doing, then re-
inforcement would occur. In other words, they could 
not keep their helpless cognitions oecause they would 
prove their competency by obtaining their goai, 
18 
therefore goals are set by depressed people to "avoid11 
reinforcement. The depressed person c~~ set obtainable 
goals on low ego involved tasks because the overwhelm-
ing amount of experience (i.e. a self concept of being 
helpless) is contrary to the minimal reinforcement 
obtained by achieving the goal and, therefore, the 
reinforcement is discounted in light of greater evi-
dence to the contrary. The helpless cognitive set of 
depressed subjects was expected to operate, however, on 
the p:obabilitJ of ob~aining their goal on the ac&d£mic 
examination. 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
Subjects 
Twenty six male and 26 female volunteer under-
graduate students at Oklahoma State University served 
as subjects., All subjects were enrolled in summer 
session psychology courses ru1d received course credit 
for participation in the experiment. The subjects were 
assigned to six groups based on sex and their scores on 
the Beck Depression Inventory. The eight males and 
eight females who scored 13 or above on the inventory 
(i.e .. beyond 1 SD above the mean, x = 7.6) were assign-
ed to the high group, the low group was composed of 
eight male and eight female subjects who scored 3 or 
below {i&e. beyondl §.l? below the mean) and the middle 
group included the eight males and eight females who 
scored between 6 and 9 {i.eG withir.1 .. 5 SD of the mean). 
Apparatus and Materials 
Chance ~ 
The apparatus was a Carousel slide projector that 
contained an X slide, an 0 slide and blank slides. A 
19 
blank slide was positioned between the X and 0 slides 
and was projected onto the screen between trials. The 
experimenter could covertly control whether an X or an 
0 would be presented on each trial by moving the tray 
either forward or backward. 
Skill Task 
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The apparatus was a modification of Sky's (1950) 
apparatus as described by Miller and Seligman (197J). 
The apparatus ..:om . ds ted of a three inch bJi' four: inch 
movable wooden platform, resembling an elevator, con-· 
tained within a two foot high vertical frame. An eight 
foot long nylon string, which the subject pulled to 
raise the platform, was attached to the top of the 
platform and passed through a pulley. So that the 
experimenter could covertly control success and failure, 
an electroma~~et was inserted into a hole in the base 
of the platform. Small strips of brass were connected 
to the magnet and attached to either side of the wood 
flange located at the back of the platform. Brass 
strips lined the interior of the frame at the rear of 
the apparatus and springs on the flange kept the strips 
of brass in contact as the platform was raised and 
lowered. Concealed wires connected the brass strips 
to a power source and· silent switch. The circut was 
borken·by the experimenter depressing the silent 
. 21 
switch under his desk. A !,inch steel ball bearing 
was held in place by the magnet on top of the platform. 
The top of the platform was sloped slightly forward so 
that the bearing would roll off whenever the switch 
was depressed. Subjects were required to lift the 
platform to a specific point near the top of the appa-
ratus without letting the ball fall off. 
Academic Examination 
A standard test was administered to all students 
in the class. The test was part of the regular class 
schedule, The tests were either the first or the second 
test given during the term. Subjects were selected 
from five different psychology classes from the fresh-
man to junior levele The tests were either all 
multiple choice or predominantly multiple choice with. 
some short answer questions. 
~ Depressio~ Inventoti 
(Appendix A~ 
A 21-catagory multiple choice inventory was ad-
ministered to all students in the ~lass. The choices 
were arranged with the less severe statements first 
followed by the more severe. The development of the 
inventory is described by Beck (1967). Briefly, the 
22 
inventory was constructed as a device to differentiate 
between depressed and nondepressed psychotic patients •.. 
It was primarily clinically derived although it has 
been empirically validated. Correlations between in-
ventory scores and clinical judgements of depth of 
depression are approximately .65 (Beck, 1967). Split-
half reliability of the inventory was .93 (Beck, 1967) 
and Miller and Seligman report a test-retest reliability 
after 3 months o;f .74. 
Procedure 
Subjects were given the Beck Depression Inventory 
in their classes. The standard instructions of Beck 
(1967) were read to the students. The inventories were 
collected and scored by the experimenter. Within two 
days,· or the next class session after the inventory 
was given, subjects were given the academic test. 
Before starting the test students were asked by another 
experimenter to estimate their percentage grade and 
their likelihood of achieving this expected grade on a 
scale from 0 (certain failure) . to 10 (certain success). 
· Subjects were then assigned to groups based on 
their sex and depression inventory scores. Approxi-
mately one-half of the students in the classes did not 
participate in this study due to failure to complete 
the test and the depression inventory, not granting 
23 
permission for their test grade to be used in the study 
or an over abundance of students in one group (either 
sex.or depression or both). Subjects were counter-
balanced to receive either the chance or skill task 
first. Before each task instructions explaining the 
task were read to the subjects by the second experi-
menter. These instructions were taken from Miller and 
Seligman (1973) and can be found in appendix B. After 
it was assured that the subjects understood the task, 
they \vere asked to e.stimate tfl.~ir expected com}Jeter.cy 
level over the ten trials and to predict the probability 
of achieving this goal using a scale ranging from 0 
(certain failure) to 10 (certain sucess). The expect-
ancy of success for individual trials was also obtained. 
After completion of the first task, instructions 
for the second task were given and the expected goal as. 
well as the expectancy of. success for this goal ar.d for 
individual trials were obtainedo 
Before each trial the experimenter recorded the· 
subject's expectancy of success. Success and failure on 
both tasks were controlled by the experimenter to in-
sure that all subjects had the same schedule of success. 
Success and failure on both tasks were controlled by the 
experimenter to insure that all subjects had the same 
schedule of success. Subjects were given ten trials on 
both tasks. Trials one and ten of both tasks were 
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selected in advance as success trials in order to use 
the same dependent measures as Miller and Seligman (1973). 
The .same 50% success schedule was used for both tasks. 
With the skill task the silent switch was depressed as 
soon as the subject began to raise the platform on fail-
ure trials. The chance task was also controlled by the 
experimenter, who could move the slide tray either 
forward to the X slide or backward to the 0 slide. 
Success on the chance task was defined as correctly pre-
dic·dng 4 or 5 ou·~ of 5 times the correct slid<.J to -~e 
presented for each trial. After both tasks subjects were 
asked if they had any questions and told not to reveal 
the design of the experiment to anyonee After all the 
data were collected subjects were debriefed by written 
explanations of the study handed out in class. 
Dependent Measures 
The three dependent measures used by Miller and 
Seligman (1973) were used on the skill and chance tasks. 
The first dependent variable was the difference between 
the expectancies given prior to the first and second 
trials, and is an index of the expectancy change follow-
ing success on the first trial. The second measure was 
the final expectancy stated and is a measure of the 
cumulative effects of success over all trials. The third 
dependent measure was found by summing the absolute 
values of the differences in expectancies between one 
trial and next trial in which expectancy change was.in 
the appropriate direction (i.e. expectancy increased 
following success and decreased following failure). A 
fourth dependent measure was added which was thought 
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to be a more accurate index of the effects of success . 
and failure on expectancy change. The new measure was 
found by taking the summation of appropriate changes in 
expectancy and subtracting the total amount of inappro-
priat~ expectan<;y change (i.e. increa::se ufter failule 
and decrease after success). These four dependent 
measures were analyzed by four 3 x 2 x 2 split plot 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with high, medium and low 
depression scores as one factor, type of task as the B 
factor and sex as the C factor. 
The other dependent measures, which were obtained 
on ~11 three tasks, were the estimate of the goal for 
the task and the expectancy of reaching the goal •. The 
estimated and obtained test scores were analyzed by a 
3 x 2 x 2 .split plot AN OVA with depression, sex and 
type of task as the factors. 
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Hypotheses 
1. It was hypothesized that the results of Miller 
and Seligman (1973) would be replicated: (a) on the 
chance task the depression groups were not expected to 
differ in expectancy change and (b) the low depression 
group was expected to exhibit larger expectancy changes 
than the high depression group on the skill task. 
2. (a) The low depression group was expected to 
have predicted and obtained scores on the academic test 
that did not differ significantly; (b) the high depres-
sion group was expected to have predicted and obtained 
scores that differed, with the predicted scores being 
greater; (c) no difference in estimated goals was ex-
pected on the chance task between the depression 
groups and (d) on the skill task, high depression sub-
jects were expected to have lower estimated goals than 
the nondepressed group. 
CHAPTER III 
RESU~LTS 
Due to the numerous analyses made~ the results 
will be presented corresponding to the order of the 
hypotheses. In general the resul-ts of Miller and 
Seligman (1973) were replicated. Table I presents 
the mear1s for the ini ti.al expectancy and the four 
dependent measures on the skill and chance tasks. Be-
fore expectancy changes were comparedg it was first 
necessary to determine if there were differences be-
tween groups on the initial expectancies. A 
depression X sex X' ,task split plot analysis of vari-
ance (Table II} was conducted for initial expectancies. 
The onl.f slg:1.i:'!.cant vffect was due to tlie ta:.::t: va:;:oi·· 
able (£:1,, 42 = 14. 75, I! < .01), with the chance task 
eliciting greater expectancies of success than the 
skill task, 
Next, the expectancy changes were compared over 
depression and sex groups and type of task. On all 
four measures of expectancy change (Tables III, IV, 
V and VI) the ANOVAS showed main effects due to type 
of task. with greater expectancy changes for the skill 
task than for the chance task (expectancy change from 
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Initial 
Expectancv 
- .., 
Ex-pectancy 
Change 
from 
Trial 1 to 
'l'rial 2 
Final 
Expectancy 
Appropriate 
Expectancy 
Change 
Total 
Expectancy 
Cbance D 
Initial 
Expectancy 
Expectancy 
Change 
from 
Trial 1 to 
·Trial 2 
Final 
Expectancy 
'rABLE I 
l'ilEANS AND STAI·JDARD DEVIATIONS OF 
DE2ESSION AND SEX GROUPS :F'OR 
CHAl·.;c~ AND SKILL 
Low De-pression 
:·.:ale Female 
Skill Chance Skill Chance 
,2. 25 2.26 2.63 5·50 (1. 49) (2 .J9) (2. 50) (2. 62) 
4.50 1.1J 5.6J 1•13 
(2.67) (0.83) (2.60) (2 .1 0) 
5.38 J.63 6.25 5.63 
( 1. JO) ( 1. 68) (1.?.5) ( 1 . 60) 
14.50 7.00 16.62 6.25 
(7.09) (3.J7) ( 7. 40) (3. 54) 
12.J8 6.88 15.75 5.13 
(9.18) (3.60) (8.17) (4.64). 
l•iiddle Depression 
3.86 4.63 2.00 2.87 
(3. 00) (2. 00) (1. 60) (2.JO) 
2.75 o.oo 3·75 1. 6J (J. 21) (1.41) (J,JJ) (1.19) 
5·25 5.00 '+. 63 4.00 (1.98) (1. 69) (2.72) (2. 00) 
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TABLE I (continued) 
Appropriat"e 
9.38 4.37 Expectancy 11.12 5.00 
Change (4.56) (2.92) (6.47) (1.85) 
Total 
Expectancy 6.38 1.88 11.00 4.88 
Change (6.70) (4.52) (6.55) {1.18) 
_Low. Depression 
Initial 2.50 3~50 1.88 3.00 
EXpectancy (2.28) (1.93) (1.45) (2.25) 
Expectancy 
Change 
4.25 4.75 from . 1. 75 2.88 
Trial 1 to (2.31) (2.J1) ( l. 75) {2.0J) 
Trial 2 
Final 6.13 4.25 4.75 2.88 
Expectancy (1.88) (2.76) (1.75) (2.23) 
Appropriate 
Expectancy 11.13 4.13 1~!'05 5.13 
Change (6.22) (3.83) (9.09) (7.25) 
Total 
Expectancy 9.88 ).25 8.88 2.12 
Change (8.95) (4.27) (11.18) (9.52) 
TABLE II 
ANOVA SUMMARY TABLE FOR 
INITIAL EXPECTANCIES 
Source of variation 
A(depression) 
C(sex) 
AC 
Subject w. group error 
B(task) 
AB 
BC 
ABC 
B x subject 
**p (.01 
0 p (.10 
w. group error 
df 
2 
1 
2 
42 
1 
2 
l 
2 
42 
MS F 
170.66 2541° 
3J.84 0.47 
48.37 o.68 
?0 .. 76 
1073.34 25.69** 
15elJ 0~36 
.31.51 Oe75 
~-3 .17 O.J2 
41.79 
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TABLE III 
ANOVA SUMMARY TABLE FOR THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 
FIRST TWO EXPEGTANC!ES 
Source of variation df $ MS 
A(depression) 2 11.07 
C(sex) 1 0.42 
AC 2 20.39 
Subject w. group error 42 5.82 
B(task) 1 266.66 
AB 2 5.01 
BC 1 5.04 
ABC 2 4.20 
B x subject w. group error 42 7.19 
**p <. 01 
*p <. 05 
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F 
1.90 
Oe01 
).50*' 
37.10** 
0.70 
0.70 
0,58 
TABLE IV 
ANOVA SUIVll\'f~RY TABLE FOR 
THE FINAL EXPECTANCY 
Source of variation df 
A(depression) 2 4.34 
C(sex) 1 1.50 
AC 2 17.72 
Subject w. group error 42 5.29 
B(task) 1 32.66 
AB 2 4.14 
BC 1 0.)7.5 
ABC 2 1.22 
B X subject w. group error42 2.)6 
** < p .01 
*p (.0.5 
32 
F 
0.82 
0.28 
* ).)5 
1).82 ** 
1.7.5-
0.16 
0 • .52 
TABLE V 
ANOVA SU~J~RY TABLE FOR THE TOTAL 
EXPECTANCY CHANGE 
Source of variation df MS 
~ ., 
A( depression) 2 117.16 
C(sex) 1 25.01 
AC 2 '0.'67 
Subject w. group error 42 49.03 
B(task) 1 1254.26 
AB 2 22e79 
BC 1 12.76 
ABC 2 3.29 
B x subject w. group error 42 32.17 
**p < .01 
0 p (.10 
33 
F 
2.4ogc 
0 .. 51 
0.01 
38c98** 
0.71 
o.4o 
0.12 
** 
TABlE VI 
- "' ··-.· r . - "' -
ANOVA SUfill'MRY TABLE FOR APPROPRIATE 
EXPECTANCY CHANGE 
Source of variation 
A(depression) 
C(sex) 
AC 
,· ·,.' 
Subjects w. group error 
B(task) 
AB 
BC 
ABC 
B X subject w. group error 
p ( .01 
df 
2 
1 
2 
42 
1 
2 
1 
2 
42 
MS F 
170.67 2.41° 
33.84 0.48 
48.37 0.68 
70.76 
1073.34 25.69 ** 
15.12 0.36 
31.51 0.75 
13.17 0.31 
41.79 
0 p < .10 
• 
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trial 1 to trial 2, F1 , 42 = 37.10, R (.01; final 
expectancy F1 ,42 = 13.82]. ( .01; total amount of 
appropriate expectancy change, F1 ,42 = 25.69, E < .01). 
There were no other significant main or interaction 
effects for either measure of total expectancy change. 
On the final expectancy stated and on the difference 
between the first two expectancies there were signif-
icant depression X sex interactions (F2 ,42 = 3.35, 
E < .05; F2 ,42 = 3.50, .12 (.05 respectively). Further 
analyses cf these interactions (Figure· l ar.d Figure 2) 
indicates that for both measures there are no differ-
ences over levels of depression for males. For females 
there were significant differences for both indicies 
between the low and high depression groups, with the low 
groups obtaining higher expectancy changes (final ex~ 
pectancy, ..9.2 , 42 = 3. 70, E. ( • 05; expectancy change from 
trial 1 to trial 2, s 2 , 42 = 3.52 .:2 ( .05). This trend 
was present on the final expectancies but it was not 
significant. No other significant differences pertain-
ing to these interactions were found. These results can 
be understood only with reference to the interactions 
of effects discussed below. 
It was hypothesized that there would be no differ-
ences in expectancy change over depression groups on the 
chance task and decreasing amounts of expectancy change 
on the skill task as level of depression increased. 
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These results were not indicated by significant de-
pression by task interactions, but because.they were 
hypqthesized further analyses were conducted (see 
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Figure 3, 4, 5 and 6). On the final expectancy stat-
ed, the low depression group scored significantly higher 
than the high group on the chance task (t42 = 2.99, 
~ (.01). No other differences on the chance task 
.were significant. On the skill task the high and 
middle groups did not differ on any measure of expec-
tancy change. ·.Jn both measures of totc>.l expectancy 
change, and the difference between the first two 
expectancies, the low group showed greater expectancy 
changes than the middle group on the skill task 
(appropriate minus inappropriate expectancy change, 
!42 = 2. OJ, Jl < . 05; total expectancy change, 
_!42 = 2.25, Jl ( .05; trial 2 minus trial 1, t 42 .= 196, 
:g < . 05). This trend was present for the final expec-
tancy (Figure 3) although it was not significant. For 
appropriate minus inappropriate expectancy change 
(Figure 6), the high depression group had significantly 
lower scores than the low group (,!42 = 1. 76, .2 .(, • 0 5) • 
This trend was present for the other three measures, 
but not significantly so. No other significant dif-
ferences on these four measures were found. Therefore, 
differences were not generally found across depression 
groups on the chance task, as predicted'. On the skill 
Mean Final 
Expectancy 
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Expectancy 
Change from 
Trial 1 
to 
Trial 2 
5 
4 
J 
2 
1 
E High depression 
M Middle depression 
L Low depression 
40 
Skill .Chance 
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to Trial 2 for Depression 
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test the helplessness model was supported in part, by 
the amount of expectancy change increasing as level 
of depression lessened from the middle to the low 
depression group. 
The academic test scores (predicted and obtained) 
were analyzed to determine if the amount of goal over-
estimation increased with level of depression. Table 
VII presents the means of the predicted and obtained 
test scores and the predicted and obtained goals for the 
char.ce and skill tasks. The ANCVA (Ta."ole VIII) with 
depression, sex and predicted vs obtained scores as 
factors, indicated a significant main effect with pre-
dieted scores being higher than obtained scores 
(F 1 ,42 = 7. 96, P < . 01). A main effect for depression 
was also obtained (£:2 ,42 = 6.56, .:2 ( .01). Further 
analysis indicated both the middle and high groups 
scored significantly lower than the low group (g2 ,42 = 
4.76, p < .01; £!.2 ,42 = 4.16, p ( .01 respectively). 
There was no significant difference between the high 
and middle groups. The main purpose of analysing the 
~ scores was to determine if the amount of over-
estimation of obtained scores increased with greater 
levels of depression. This was found, as the difference 
between the predicted and obtained scores for the low 
group was nonsignificant (Figure 7). The middle and 
high groups, however, did predict significantly higher 
Predicted 
Exam 
Scores 
Obtained 
E}CL=t.l1 
Scores 
Predicted 
Skill 
Task 
Goals 
?redicted 
Chance 
Task 
Goals 
44 
TAJU VII 
C~-iAI\C.:i: AI\D SKILL 
Low D~p. 
);~ale .:Fe male 
86.50 8].88 
. { 5 ·'+ 5 )( 8. 04) 
84.70 BJ.OO ( 11 • 97 ) ( 14. 60) 
3.25 5.12 
(1.91) ( 1. 64) 
2.88 5·25 
(:1.. 96) (1.?5) 
2.1ASKS 
lVliddle Dep. High Dep. 
Male Female Male Female 
76.75 77.88 78.80 77.30 (18.50)(15.41) (14.67)(10.30) 
67.25 70.50 68.60 76.10 {1?.65)(11.8?) (13.91){11.5?) 
).88 3·37 4.12 J.OO (1.25) (1.30) (1.96) (2. 00) 
J.25 ).50 4.12 J.25 (1.28) ( 1 • 77) (1.?3) ( 1. 66) 
* 
TABLE VIII 
ANOVA SUMMARY TABlE FOR PREDICTED 
AND OBTAINED TEST SCORES 
· Source of variation · 
A(depression) 
C(sex) 
AC 
Subject w. group error 
B(obtained vs predicted) 
AB 
BC 
ABC 
B X subject w. group error 
p < .05 
df 
2 
1 
2 
42 
1 
2 
l 
2 
42 
- . ; ~! 
1295.84 
4.59 
45.84 
197.)8 
765.01 
112.95 
33.84 
10.40 
96.11 
F 
6.56 * 
0.02 
0.23 
7.96 * 
1.18 
0.35 
0.11 
Test 
Scores 
100 
90 Low 
80 
70 
------....::::: 
60 
50 
40 
JO 
20 
10 
Predicted Obtained 
Fifure 7• Kean Predicted and Obtained Test 
Scores for Depression Groups 
scores than they obtained (t42 = 2.31, E ( .05; 
t42 = 2.20, Q ( .05, respectively). 
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Analysis of the predicted goals for the chance 
a~d skill tasks was done to determine if goal setting 
on these tasks varied with level of depression (Table 
IX). The ANOVA used to compare goals for the skill 
and chance tasks across sex and depressiongroups 
revealed a significant depression by sex interaction 
(F2 ,42 = 4.07, E ( .05, see Figure 8). No other main 
or intera''!tion effBcts were eignificarrt" Purther 
analysis of the depression X sex interaction indicated 
that low depression females made higher predictions 
than low depression males (.Q2 , 42 = 4.05, J2. ( .01) and 
medium and high scoring females (Q2 , 42 = 3.27, ]. ( .05; 
o2 , 42 = 3.92, E ( .01, respectively). Further analy-
sis was done to test the hypotheses that no differences 
would exist due to depression on the chance task but 
that there would be an inverse relationship between 
depression and height of predicted goal for the skill 
task, No differences were found for the skill condition, 
In the chance condition there were no differences be-
tween the high and middle groups; the low group, however, 
made significantly higher predictions than the middle 
group (,!42 = 2.03, J2. ( .05), There were no other sig-
nificant differences among the predicted scores, 
TABlE IX 
A NOVA SUl\'lMARY TABLE. FOR __ PREDICTED 
GOALS ON TAsKS 
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--------.._-----·-~-~------------·---· ---
Source of variation df MS F 
----------~--------------~------·--~·----------------
A(depression) 
C(sex) 
AC 
Subject Wv group error 
B(task) 
AB 
BC 
ABC 
2 ).50 
1 2e6? 
2 20.79 
42 4.43 
1 0.16 
2 Os29 
1 1~15 
2 0.12 
B X subject w~ group error 42 lo63 
..... -~ ... 
0.79 
0.,60 
4 .. 70* 
0 .. 10 
0.,18 
0~92 
0.08 
Goal 
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. Figure 8. · Goal Predictions for Males and 
Females on the Tasks for 
Depression Groups 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The helplessness model for depression was in part 
supported by this study. The low depression group did 
not express helplessness (i.e. they reported high ex-
pectancies of success) but the middle and high depres-
sion groups exhibited a failure to perceive themselves 
as being able to control their environment. In other 
words, depressed people reported low expectancies of 
success when control is perceived by nondepressed 
people. 'rhe middle and high groups did not 11 learn" 
that they were not helpless in the skill task but the 
low depression group acquired this knowledge. The 
helplessness model was only partially supported as the 
middle and high groups did not express differing levels 
of helplessness, as would be predicted from the differ-
ing levels of depression. 
It was also found that levels of depression are 
also related to the accuracy with which one sets goals 
for himself on important tasks. The low depression 
group had an accurate estimate of their ability on the 
academic test (i.e. similar predicted and obtained 
50 
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scores). The middle and high groups, however, signif-
icantly overestimated their abilities on the test 
(predicted scores being higher than obtained). Again 
the overestimation hypothesis for depression was only 
partially supported, as the middle and high groups did 
not differ in amount of inaccuracy as would be pre-
dicted by the model. The similarities of the middle 
and high groups are discussed in detail below. 
Before expectancy changes are discussed, it is 
thought tha-t the differences in ini tic>.l ex:r>ectancy on 
the chance and skill tasks must be examined to determine 
if the amount of change was affected by differing 
starting points. The differences on initial expectancy 
indicates that subjects, naive to the tasks, thought 
that the chance task would be less difficult than the 
skill task. While this difference was statistically 
significant, it is not thought to be great enough, in 
absolute terms, to affect expectancy change in a mean-
ingful way. The only possible contribution this 
difference in initial expectancy could have on 
expectancy change was to create a ceiling effect on 
the chance task. It is unlikely that the greater 
expectancy changes on the skill task estimates can be 
attributed to a ceiling affect in the chance condition. 
The initial score for the chance task was low ().68 on. 
a scale to 10) and large changes ·in expectations did 
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occur on the chance task. Then, despite this initial 
difference in expectancy, it is thought that the expec-
tancy changes can be meaningfully compared and 
discussed. 
As hypothesized there were no differences on the 
chance task between depression groups for the two 
measures of total expectancy change and the difference 
between the first two expectancies. For some unknown 
reason, however, the low depression group stated higher 
fi na]_ exp~ctaT'.cies than the high de:prf!S8ion g:o:-oup. 
From three of the four measures it can be inferred that 
level of depression did not significantly affect the 
subjects' perception of competancy on the chance task. 
In other words, subjects reported similar levels of help-
lessness over control of the task irrespective of 
depression levels. The results of expectancy change on 
the chance task are supportive of the helplessness 
model. 
On the skill task, however, the amounts of expec-
tancy change are supportive of the model only in part. 
As predicted by the helplessness model, there was an 
inverse relationship between depression scores and 
expectancy change for the low and middle groups. The 
high group, which did not follow this trend,fully, 
expressed scores similar to, or slightly (but not 
significantly) greater than the middle group. The 
53 
question arises as to why, if the helplessness model 
is valid, the most depressed subjects did not express 
the most helplessness. The helplessness model of 
depression has been supported by Miller and Seligman 
(1973) and by the middle and low groups of this study. 
But a similarity between middle and high groups has 
been found elsewhere. Lack of differences on a depen-
dent measure between high and middle groups in 
contrast to significant differences between these 
groupf::; and a luw depre..ssion group v.ere fo·;Jnd. b:y 
Cysewski, Weiner and Younger (1975) on a paper and 
pencil test concerned with the number and intensity o£ 
social relationships. 
Two possible explanations may exist for similar 
behavior of the middle and high depression groups. 
First, the helplessness model may be valid for a rel-
atively narrow and mild range of depression and not 
applicable to the more severe depression. The high 
depression group of Miller and Seligman had a mean 
score on the Eeck Depression Inventory of 12.4. This 
score would.place them midway between the middle 
(X = 8.1) and the high (X = 16.4) groups of the pre-
sent study. It is possible that the more extreme 
scores of the high group in the present study .rnay 
account for the apparent curvilinear relationship be-
tween depression and helplessness. Further research 
should be conducted to determine if increased helpless-
ness is representative of depression in only a narrow 
and mild range or if helplessness increases with level 
of depression throughout the continuum. 
The second explanation centers around the nature 
of the subject population. Two lines of thought emerge 
here. First, it may be that students who are "helpless" 
become defensive when directly questioned about their 
abilities and their confidence in their abilities. It 
is not unreasontLble to think that througr. years of 
evaluation by authority figures students learn to 
present their best side and, when feeling inadequate, 
to bluff authority figures for desired rewards. This 
explanation may be discounted in the present study 
. because, if defensiveness occurred on the experimental 
tasks, it should also have been manifested on the 
Depression Inventory. There is no reason to believe 
that a student would admit to the socially undesirable 
symptoms of depression, but would exagerate his feel-
ings of competency on tasks which are relatively 
meaningless to him. 
It may be that the nature of the subject population 
can explain the finding that the most depressed group 
did not express appropriate helplessness. It is sug-
gested that there is a minimum level of competency, 
social skills, confidence, etc. required for continued 
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enrollment in college, and that people not posses-
sing these tend to drop out or not enroll in college. 
It ~s possible, therefore, that people in the high 
depression group of this study were not representative 
of the population of people scoring between 13 and 27 
on the depression inventory in their skills, competency, 
etc. It is also possible that the middle and low 
groups were more representative of their populations. 
The fact the high group was most difficult to find 
qualified subjects for lends support to a propvsed 
selection of a "nonhelpless" group of depressed students-; 
the students who continue in college have the necessary 
skills, confidence, etc. It is suggested that some 
minimal level of confidence (maximum level of helpless-
ness) for continued enrollment may lie around the level 
represented by the middle group. If this is so then 
the high group in this study was composed of those 
people with high depression scores but with higher 
skills and confidence than is true for most people who 
score in this range on the depression inventory. It is 
interesting to note the slight increase in expectancy 
change from the middle to the high group on the skill 
task. This increase may reflect an increase in confi-
dense necessary to counterbalance the other manifes-
tations of depression detrimental to remaining in 
school. 
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The sex by depression interactions for final 
expectancy, expectancy change from trial 1 to trial 2, 
and perhaps goal predictions for the chance and skill 
tasks, indicated that females, but not males, had 
scores inversely proportional to their depression 
level, imply that males are more prone to selection by 
competancy than females. Males may require, in other 
words, more confidence in their abilities th~~ females. 
These results, while generally supportive of the 
helpl€ssness model, also raise some ques·::icns. S tucents 
who score high on the Beck Depression Inventory (13-27) 
express helplessness similar to those students who 
score less on the inventory (6-9). Therefore, while 
level of depression increases, the level of helplessness 
may not. As stated above, the lack of relationship may 
indicate that (a) helplessness is not representative of 
more depressed college students or (b) the relationship 
between helplessness and depression is not isomorphic 
(one dimension may vary while the other holds constant). 
The lack of a clear-cut helplessness-depression 
relationship, if such exists, is not surprising due to 
the crudeness of the measurement techniques involved 
(e.g. helplessness measured by expectancy change). 
Further research should be conducted to test the help-
lessness model using other techniques to measure both 
depression and helplessness. 
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This study was composed of two parts. First, the 
Miller and Seligman (1973) study was replicated. Next 
depression was examined as a factor involved in differ-
ential goal setting. It was hypothesized that goals 
for the chance task would not differ over depression 
groups but in the skill condition there would be an 
inverse relationship between level of depression and 
predicted goals. These hypotheses were not supported. 
The lack of congruence between these data and the above 
rem:.l ts s1pporting the helplr;ssness model 1.1ight b~ ex-
plained by examining the subjects' familiarity with the 
tasks. The tasks involved were ones with which the 
people had little experience. Therefore, asking for 
goals at the beginning of the study required people to 
.guess how well they thought they could do in unfamiliar 
situations. The l2ck of a relationship between depres-
sion level and height of predicted goals in fact 
support the helplessness model, for if depression were 
manifested in a. gross negative view of the self, then 
one would expect differences in all goals, (i.e. I am 
bad and cannot succeed any where, !~·any time). But the 
depressed subjects• cognitive distortion was limited 
to failure to learn from success, i.e. to learn they 
were not helpless. A more global negative view would 
cause depressed subjects to predict lower goals on the 
tasks. 
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The chance and skill tasks differ from the aca-
demic examination in that college students have a long 
history of familiarity with tests. Because o:f this 
familiarity~· the students did not set goals from a 
naive position as they did on the skill and chance 
tasks.. Therefore, one would expect the goals set. on 
the academic exam to manifest the cognitive distortion 
of helplessness, if it were present. The results 
1" • 
obtained were contradictory to the helplessness model 
of depression, since the more depressed subjects did 
not express lower goals on the test (signifying help-
lessness)~ Helplessness is a ;• specific cognitive 
distortion of one's own responses to change the envi-
ronment ••• " (Miller & Seligman, 197:3, p62). In other 
words, one should underestimate his or her ..2.!!D, 
abilities, viewing<,the world through a helpless "set". 
The low depression group predicted their approximate 
scores on the examQ This group can be viewed as having 
accurate perceptions of their abilities. If helpless-
ness were operating, the middle and high groups should 
have underestimated their obtained scores. Because 
this did not occur, one must conclude the helplessness 
was not functioning in the task. As predicted. the 
more depressed subjects scored. lower on the test than 
the goals which they set for themselves on the exam. 
It may be that this failure to obtain important goals 
which the subjects set for themselves represents the 
kind of support that is needed to keep helplessness 
functioning on less important tasks. 
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It could be argued that the lack of overestimation 
for the low group may be due to a ceiling effect.. i.e. , 
their competency levels were so near the top of the 
scale they could not overestimate their scores. It is 
true that the middle and high groups did have more 
''room" to overestimate their obtained test scores, but 
the largest predicted - obtained cifference was 8 
points. The low group had enough room to overestimate 
their scores by twice this amount (i.e. 16). Therefore, 
no ceiling effect is suggested. It is interesting to 
note the similarities between the middle and high 
groups on the obtained and predicted test scores. This 
similarity possibly occurred because of the above dis-
cussed selection process which may weed out depressed 
people who do not have the necessary skills to compete 
in college. 
The results obtained on the academic examination 
are supportive of a reinforcement model of depression. 
The low depression group obtained higher scores than 
the middle and high groups. It can be assumed that 
higher scores on a test are more reinforcing than 
lower scores. Reinforcement has two related dimen-
sions. First, there is an overt aspect of 
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reinforcement. This aspect can be easily measured 
(Lewinsohn & Libet, 1972). In the present study the 
overt dimension of reinforcement included the obtained 
scores on the examination. Another dimension of re-
inforcement is the subjective aspect. This aspect is 
determined not by absolute values, but is intimately 
related to a person's subjective goals. In the prese~t 
study, the subjective aspect of reinforcement was 
measured by the difference between the predicted and 
obtained sco:ces o:1 the ac.;adtmi ~ test. Beth of these 
aspects appear to be inversely related to depression, 
i.e., the more reir.forcement a person receives the 
less depressed he will be. The present study did not, 
however, adequately separate these two dimensions of 
reinforcement. Further research should hold each of 
these aspects constant and let the other aspect vary 
to determine each aspect's unique contribution to 
depression. 
The helplessness model of depression was support-
ed, with reservations. On the chance task, where 
subjects had no control over their success, all 
groups expressed similar levels of expectancy change, 
indicating they perceived themselves as having little 
control over the task. On the skill task the low de-
pression group perceived control over the task, as 
implied by the large expectancy of success changes. 
The middle and high groups, however, expressE.~d smaller 
amounts of expectancy change, indicating they per-
ceived little control over the task, i~e., they were 
"helpless". Reservations with the helplessness model 
exist because the high group did not express more 
helplessness (iGeo less expectancy change) than the 
middle group., The results also suggest that helpless-
ness may be manifested only on tasks in which the 
people have minimal concern (or ego involvement}. On 
important tasks, it was found that depresses people· 
set inordinately high goals for themselves. 
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It is proposed that depression manifests itself in 
one • s view of his competancy by extreme ratings, with · 
the importance of the task determining to which extreme 
the person will set his goal. In tasks with which the 
person has minimal involvement, depression will be shown, 
by helplessness and low goal setting. In a few irnporo.:.: ... 
tant areas, a depressed person will view his com.petan-
cy at the other extreme and set inordinately high 
goals. The implications of this view to therapy with 
people is two foldQ First, in areas of low importance 
to the person, the therapeutic goal would be to get 
the client to "test realityn and realize that he is not 
as helpless as he perceives himself.. Concurrently, it 
must also be conveyed to the client that he is estab~ 
lishing inordinateky high goals in important areas and 
to get him to reduce these high goals. It follows· 
that if the helpless self concept is changed without 
altering goals in ego-involved areas, then helpless-
ness should return. 
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Another implication of this study is the neces-
sity of using caution in generalizing results from 
animal studies to humans. As shown here the higher 
mental processes of people raise issues not found when 
studying other organisms. For example, it-is unlikely 
that lower organisms have a self cor.c~pt· d~.~fined ty 
the goals which they established. Humfu~s, however, 
define themselves in many ways (e.g. I am a good 
golfer, a good cook, a poor swimmer, etc.) which are 
related to goals in each specific area. If a person 
fails to obtain one of his goals (fails to behave in 
accord with an aspect of his self-concept) the sub-
jective aspect of reinforcement is not obtained. In 
depression, setting too many unrealistically high 
goals (an exaggerated self concept) may be a "rever-
verating mechanism" not found in helpless animals that 
keeps a person depressed. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
The learned helpless:ness model of depression states 
that depressed people view themselves as less effective 
than normals' in controling' thf.dr,.. environment. Help-
lessness should be manifested by depressed people 
setting lower goals or specifying lower likelihoods of 
obtaining a specific goale It was predicted that help-
lessness would not be expressed universally by depressed 
people. On tasks important for self esteem, depressed 
people were predicted to set inordinantly high goals. 
Forty eight students,·' d.i vided, into six groups· based on 
depression scores and sex, were asked to state their 
b b •l•t• ~ d" ~ t k d k"ll pro a :t. ~ ~1e~ o .. sucCI')£> ~ng on ~ c .ance ~.s an .. a s .. ~ 
task and to predict how well they would do on an aca-
demic examination. The results indicated no differences 
in expectancies of success on the chance task. On 
the skill task helplessness was expressed by the more 
depressed students, who did,not increase their expectan~ 
cy of success as they succeed on the task. On the test 
the more depressed students predicted higher scores 
than they obtained, while there was no difference 
between the predicted and obtained scores for non-
depressed students. Depression was expressed in areas 
of little importance to the person by helplessness, 
but in the few important areas, depression was mani-
fested by inordinantly high expectations. 
The results raise the question of the validity 
of using a student population for studying depression 
or other psychopathologies. It was suggested that the 
rigors of college cause an attrition of students 
who have the characteristics of more depressed people. 
The students who remain in sbhool, while perhaps 
scoring high on a depression inventory, are not rep-
resentative of the population of people with similar 
scores. 
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A. 
0 I do not feel s~d. 
1 I feel sad -cr blue. 
2a I am sad or blue all the ti~e and I can't snap 
out of it. 
2b I am so sad or unhappy that it'is quite·painful. 
3 · I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
B. 
0 I am not particularly pessimistic or discouraged 
abcut the futur·e. 
1 I feel discouraged about the future. 
2a I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
2b I feel that I won't ever get over my troubles. 
J I feel that the future is hopeless and that things 
cannot improve. 
c. 
0 I am not particularly dissatisfied. 
la I feel bored most of the time. 
lb I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
~-:. . 
2 I don't get satisfaction out of anything any more. 
3 I am dissatisfied with everything. 
D. 
0 I do not feel like a failure. 
1 I feel I have .failed more than the average person. 
2 I feel T have acomplished very little that' is ... 
worthvlhile or tl1at means.anything, 
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0 I don't feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel bad or unworthy a good part of the time. 
2a I feel quite guilty. 
2b I feel bad or unworthy practically all the time now. 
3 I feel as thou~h I am very bad or worthless. 
F. 
0 I don't feel I am being punished. 
1 I-have a feeling that something bad may happen to me. 
2 I feel I am being punished or will be punished. 
Ja I feel I deserve to be punished. 
3b T want to be punished. ..J.. 
'" 
...:r. 
0 I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
1a I am disappointed in myself. 
lb I don't like myself. 
2 I am disgus~ed with myself. 
3 I hate myself. 
H. 
0 I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
2 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes •. 
2 I blame myself for my faults. 
J I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
I. 
0 I don't have any thoughts of harming myself. 
1 I have thoughts of Harming myself, but I would not 
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carry them out. 
2a I feel I would be better off dead. 
2b I feel my family would be better off if I were dead. 
Ja I have definite plans about committing suicide. 
Jb I would kill myself if I could. 
J,. 
0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am. 
1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used tc. 
2 I feel irritated all:the time. 
J 1 don't get irritated at all at the th1ngs that 
used to irritate me. 
K. 
0 I don't cry any more than usual. 
1 I cry more now than I used to. 
2 I cry all the time now. I can't stop it. 
J I used to be able to cry but now I can 1 t cry at all 
even though I want to. 
L. 
0 I have not lost interest in other people. 
1 I am less interested in other people now than I 
used to be. 
2 I have lost most of my interest.' in other people and 
have little feelings for them. 
J I have lost all my interest in other people and 
don't care about them at all. 
0 I make decisions about as well as ever. 
1 I try to put off making decisions. 
2 I have great difficulties in making decisions. 
3 I can't :nake any decisions at all any more. 
N. 
0 I don't look any worse than I used to. 
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1 . I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
2 I feel that there are perm~ant changes in my appear-
~~ce and they make me look unattractive. 
3 I feel I am ugly or repulsive looking. 
o. 
0 I can work about as well as before. 
1a It takes extra effort to get started at doing ~ 
somethinp,:. 
1b I don't work as well as I used to. 
2 I have to push myself very to do anything. 
3 I can't do anything at all. 
B. 
0 I can sleep as well as usual. 
1 I wake up more tired in the morning than I used to. 
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it 
hard to get back to sleep. 
3 I vvake up early every day and can't get more than 
5 hours sleep. 
Q. 
0 I don't get rnore tired than usual. 
1 I get tired mere easily than I used to. 
2 I get tired from doing anything. 
3 I get too tired to do anything. 
R. 
0 Xy appetite is no worse than usual. 
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
2 r~~y appetite is much worse now. 
3 I :have nc appetite at all now. 
s. 
0 I haven't lost much weight, • .t:' l.i any, lately. 
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds. 
2 I have lest more than 10 pounds. 
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds. 
T. 
0 I am no more concerned about my health than usualQ 
1 I am concerned about aches and pains .21: upset 
sto:nach or constipation. 
2 I am so concerned with how I feel or what I feel that 
it's hard to think of much else. 
3 I am completely absorbed in what I feel. 
u. 
0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest 
in sex. 
1. I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
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2 I am much less interested in sex now • 
.3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
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Skill Instructions 
This task is designed to see how well you can 
. 
succeed in raising the platform without letting the 
ball fall off and also to see how,~accurate you are in 
estimating your success. The object of the task is for 
you to try, by pulling this string to raise the ball 
on the platform as high as possible before the ball 
falls off. You will be given 10 trials. The apparatus 
is built with a slight tilt forward so that the ball 
is more likely to fall off the platform the higher it is 
raised. Of course, if you raise the platform very 
quickly, the ball cannot fall aff because of its 
momentum. But this is a skill task, therefore, the 
platform must be raised slowly. Now, in order >to- be 
successful, you must raise the platform and the ball to 
the level marked by the green arrow. (The experimenter 
demonstrates the Faising of the platform without the 
bearing.) Are there any questions? 
Chance Instructions 
This task is designed to see how well you can do 
at telling me beforehand which of two kinds of slides 
will appear next on the screen and also to see how ac-
curate you are in estimating your success. In this 
projector we have a number of slides marked with either 
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an X or an 0. These slides are divided into groups of 
five.· Each-set of five slides was-shuffled before being 
placed into the projector. There are not necessarily 
the same number of Xs or Os in each set. Before we 
begin, I will select at random one. of these:sets of 
five slides and position it for projection. You are 
to tell me whether the first slide in the group is an 
X or an o. In this way we will go through all five 
slides in the group. 
Each set of five slides will constitute one trial. 
We will continue until we have gone through 10 trials. 
I will also be keeping score and will let you know how 
well you did at the end of each trial. 
Now, in order to be successful on a trial you must 
get at least four slides right. In other words, four 
or five slides right out of the five slides in a set 
will mean·that you have success, . Any number of slides 
correct below four will mean that you have not suc-
ceeded. Are there anY._ questions? 
Certainty Instructions 
Before each trial, I would like you to estimate 
how certain you are that you can raise the platform to 
the level marked by the green arrow without letting the 
ball fail off (for the chance task, how certain are 
you that you can correctly predict four or five out of 
':..•. 
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the five slides). You are to estimate your degree 
of certainty of success on a scale from 0 to 10. If 
you feel fairly·certain that:you will succeed, you 
may rate yourself with a high number such as a 9 or 10. 
If you're moderately sure that you will succeed, you may 
rate yourself with a number near the center of the scale 
such as a 4, 5, or 6. If you feel pretty sure that you 
will not succeed, you·may rate yourself with a low 
number such as a 0 or 1. You may use any number on 
the scale from 0 to 10 jnclusive. It is important 
,_ ·.' .. 
that you select your estimates carefully and that they 
correspond closly with how certain you really are. 
They should be an accurate description of the degree 
to which you really feel you will or will not succeed. 
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TABLE X 
SU1'1Ji1ARY TABLE FOR TUKEY •'s POST 
HOC TESTS 
Sex by depression interaction for the goals 
kale hiEh - ~ale middle 
Kale high - Male low 
Female 
Female 
·n· i :::-h 
- -L-o·• 
.h. ' 
.. lgn 
- .?emale high· 
- Female middle 
- Female low 
kale middle - ~ale low 
Male middle - Female middle 
Female :niddle - Female low 
I~ale low - Fe:nale low 
1.07 
2.02 
1~90 
0.59· 
0.95 
0.24 
).2?-r.-
4. 0 5*~< 
Sex by depression interaction for the final 
expectancy 
Kale high - Kale middle 
t~le high - Female high 
Female high - Female middle 
Female hiqh - Female low 
Eale middle - N;.ale low 
0.12 
1.12 
).50 
1.97 
J .. ?(il-¥< 
1.08 
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TABLE X (continued) 
Female middle - Female low 
Male low - Female low 
3.45 
2.50 
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Sex by depression interaction for the difference 
between the first two 
expectancies 
!ilale high - IYiale middle 
Male high - l•lale low 
Kale high - Female high 
Female high - Female middle 
Female high - Female low 
I·lale middle - h'i.ale low 
Male middle - Female middle 
Female middle ~ Female low 
Male low - Female low 
* p < .05 
~-* p <. 01 
O.JO 
2.71 
2.92 
1.16 
J.52* 
2.39 
2.17 
2.38 
.0.94 
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a major in psychology in 1974; completed the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy . 
degree from the Oklahoma State University with 
a major in clinical psychology, in May, 1976. 
Professional Exoerience: National Institute of 
Mental HeaJ.th trainee in clinical psychology at 
Oklahoma State University, 1972-1975; Pshcho-
logical associate at Payne County Guidance 
Center, 1972-1973J psychological associate at 
Psychological Services Center, Oklahoma State 
University, 1973-1975; psychology intern at 
Seattle Veterans Hospital, 1975-1976. 
